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1. Introduction
Since the celebrated work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), economists have developed a
host of equivalence theorems. These include refinements of the original Modigliani-Miller
(henceforth MM) Theorem, most notably by Stiglitz (1969, 1974) and DeMarzo (1988), and the
Ricardian equivalence results starting with Barro (1974). Wallace (1981) and Chamley and
Polemarchakis (1984) study the change of government debt composition through open market
exchanges. Their equivalence results are reviewed by Sargent (1987).
Changes in government debt composition through open market exchanges are not directly
covered by the MM Theorem because government bonds are outside assets. In the standard MM
setting, the equivalence result obtains because total asset payoffs do not change. Open market
exchanges cause asset supplies to undergo real changes. With all assets held, the total payoffs
agents receive will change. The payoff changes show up in the government budget. If the
government keeps its spending unchanged, then by an accounting identity, total transfers (taxes if
negative) must change to exactly cancel the total payoff changes and the revenues from open
market exchanges in any state of nature. In this context, a change in government finance consists
of a path change in debt composition and the accompanying changes in total transfers, and the
equivalence question is whether some new, agent-specific transfer scheme that implies the
required total transfers can (1) keep the optimal consumption of each agent unchanged and (2)
cause the asset markets to clear. For a representative agent economy, the transfer scheme that
implies a given set of total transfers is unique, and the equivalence issue is the same as the
relevance of government finance issue. In a more general setting, the equivalence issue is related
to the relevance of government finance issue in a narrower sense: there is equivalence when a
change in government finance is irrelevant under a specific transfer scheme. By covering changes2
of debt composition (with perhaps zero accompanying changes in transfers), our equivalence
concept may be regarded as a generalization of the Ricardian equivalence concept, which focuses
on the equivalence between debt and taxes (transfers).
Our study is based on the assumption that the government has the power to impose agent
specific, state specific lump-sum transfers. While such a government does not exist in the real
world, it still has to rely on private incentives and is far less powerful than the idealized central
planner. It is this limit to governmental power that keeps the equivalence issue non-trivial.
In an interesting special case, Wallace (1981) shows that any transfer scheme that keeps
each agent’s lifetime resource unchanged and satisfies another condition can cancel a change in
government finance and leave allocations as well as asset prices unchanged. Wallace’s complete
market framework has two-date lives and a special asset structure (fiat money plus one-period
assets). This paper extends the Wallace result by allowing an arbitrary number of assets with
arbitrary returns and an arbitrary mixture of finitely and infinitely lived agents.
In Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984),  there is no need for transfer changes because
payoff changes are exactly canceled by the revenues from open market exchanges. The flexible
price level changes in such a way that the real returns of the sole nominal asset become a
weighted average of its initial returns and the returns of the real asset whose supply is changed,
and the effects of open market exchanges are thereby perfectly canceled. Elegant as it is, their
result, which is valid even with incomplete markets, is subject to a number of qualifications and
seems difficult to generalize. The qualifications have to do with the side effects of a price level
change. The situation is reminiscent of Stiglitz (1974) and DeMarzo (1988), who establish the
validity of the MM Theorem with incomplete markets under the condition that one asset’s payoffs
are independent of another asset’s price. This condition, whose importance is demonstrated by3
Gottardi (1994, 1995) and Detemple, Gottardi and Polemarchakis (1995), can remain satisfied
even if bankruptcies are allowed, but is usually unsatisfied in the presence of instruments such as
stock options. The parallel condition for the validity of the Chamley-Polemarchakis result, about
which we will have little more to say, is that changes in price level do not affect the equilibrium in
undesirable ways. Under normal circumstances, this requires that (1) there is a single nominal
asset, (2) there are no nominal transfers, and (3) asset payoffs, which can be contingent contracts,
do not depend on the price level. The lengthiness of this list is not surprising; in Chamley and
Polemarchakis (1984) a single scalar process (the price level) bears all the burden of restoring
equilibrium.
The “money” in both Wallace (1981) and Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) is the
Samuelson-Wallace variety (Samuelson, 1958; Wallace, 1980): it is held for returns, not for
transactional services. Their “open market operations” are not the same as the open market
operations conducted by the Federal Reserve System, namely the open market exchanges between
government bonds and transactional money. In this paper, we will briefly discuss how our formal
results fare when transactional money is introduced.
Here is a summary of the paper. Section 2 introduces a general framework of asset
markets and individual optimization. A key ingredient of the framework is the government budget
constraint, which (under the assumption that there is no government spending) unambiguously
identifies the aggregate transfers under a given path for government debt.
Section 3 establishes two equivalence theorems. Theorem 1 shows that the effects of a
change in government finance on allocations and prices are zero under some transfer scheme even
if markets are incomplete. The proposed transfer scheme is shown to leave each agent’s lifetime
resource unchanged under any state price process. For a representative agent economy, the4
proposed transfer scheme is the only one possible, and Theorem 1 becomes a generalized
Ricardian equivalence result: it implies that neither the level nor the composition of debt matters.
It is observed that Theorem 1 remains valid in the presence of transactional money as long as the
path of money supply does not change.
Section 3 then moves to a complete market setting and explains why it is not generally
true that any transfer scheme that leaves the lifetime resource of each agent unchanged can cancel
a change in government finance. Theorem 2 shows that a sufficient and necessary condition for
any transfer scheme that leaves the lifetime resource of each agent unchanged to be able to cancel
a change in government finance is that agents are always collectively compensated for next
period’s return change. This condition is closely related to the intergenerational links that
normally underlie the validity of the Ricardian equivalence. In Theorem 2, intergenerational links
are not imposed, but the changes in government finance are restricted to those that do not imply
intergenerational transfers. For an economy consisting of infinitely lived “dynasties”, the condition
is automatically satisfied. It is observed that Theorem 2 is not valid in the presence of
transactional money. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Framework
This section introduces a general framework similar to that of Santos and Woodford
(1997). Consider an infinite-horizon economy with sequential trading. Agents have homogeneous
information and beliefs about the possible states on each date in the future. Let s
t be a typical
state, or node on the information tree N, on date t. Each s
t has a unique immediate predecessor s
t
- 1 and a finite number of immediate successors, a typical one of which is denoted by s
t+1|s
t. The
economy begins at s
0, the unique node on date 0. We use s
r|s
t to indicate that s
r belongs the5
subtree of N starting at s
t. That is, s
r|s
t means either s
r = s
t or s
r is a (not necessarily immediate)
successor of s
t.
There is a single numeraire good at each node. There are k(s




t). Transactional money is not among the assets. All assets can be sold short.
At each node s
t (t ‡ 1), the broadly defined dividends on assets, which include coupon payments
on bonds, are specified by a 1·k(s
t - 1) nonnegative vector d(s
t), and asset transformation is
specified by a k(s
t)·k(s
t - 1) nonnegative matrix b(s
t). The nonnegativity of d(s
t) and b(s
t) may be
understood as a consequence of free asset disposal. A k(s
t - 1)·1 portfolio Z held at the end of
trading at node s
t - 1 is paid d(s
t)Z in dividend and b(s
t)Z in assets at s
t. The one-period return
vector R(s






There are three types of assets, and they do not transform into each other. Equities are
claims to the capital and the technologically determined dividends of productive processes. Equity
supply Z1(s
t) is nonnegative. The equity quantities reflect the scales of operation. In our analysis,
the relevant equilibria all have the same equity quantities. As a result, no constant-return-to-scale
or absence of externality assumption is needed for the technology. Securities are contingent
contracts that agents trade with each other. Their supply Z2(s
t) is zero. Security dividends may
depend on price history. In our analysis, the relevant equilibria all have the same prices, and so no
reference to this dependence is needed. Bonds, which may include non-transactional (Samuelson-
Wallace type) fiat money, are assets issued by the government, which holds neither equity nor
security. The policy determined bond supply Z3(s
t) is nonnegative. The government spending is




t), and their separate price,
dividend and return vectors and transformation matrices can be straightforwardly defined.6
Let H be the set of agents, who are indexed by h. Let H(s
t) be the set of agents alive at s
t.
We assume that H(s
t) is finite at each s
t. Let N
h, a subset of the information tree N, be the
collection of nodes where agent h is alive. By these definitions, h˛H(s
t) if and only if s
t˛N
h. The
preferences of each agent h are strictly increasing: more consumption at any s
t˛N
h is strictly
preferred. For agent h, s




h. We assume that each agent h




h for any s
t+1|s
t, we say s
t is a terminal node for h.
Let N
h , a subset of N
h, be the collection of agent h’s terminal nodes. We assume that, for any h
and any s
t˛N
h, agent h either lives at none of the immediate successors of s
t (if s
t˛N
h ), or lives at
all of the immediate successors of s
t (if s
tˇN
h ). Let N
h/N
h be the collection of nodes that are in
N




t) be agent h’s k(s
t)·1 asset holding after the trading at s








t). To make s
0 just an arbitrary node in an economy that really has neither
beginning nor end, we assume that, for h˛H(s




endowment can be understood as b(s
0)Z
h(s
0 - 1), the result of holding assets at s
0 - 1. Z
h(s
0-) can
be either positive or negative, but we assume that Z(s
0-) = 





0-) is nonnegative. There is















t). The good supply at s





t - 1). For s
0, we can simply write  ~ w (s
0) = w(s
0), because the dividend agent h receives
from equities held at s
0 - 1 can be absorbed into w
h(s
0). The dividend agent h receives from
securities held at s
0 - 1 is also absorbed into w
h(s
0), but such dividend sums to zero and does not7
affect good supply. The good supply is used for either consumption or equity creation. The
amount of good used in equity creation at s




t - 1)]. Like the




t) receives lump-sum transfer (tax if negative) L
h(s





t) to be negative, but require that, through asset trading, each agent can pay all the taxes and









dividend agent h receives from bonds held at s














t - 1) + L(s
t), t ‡ 1 (2b)
For each s
t˛N
h, agent h chooses asset holding Z
h(s
t) and nonnegative consumption c
h(s
t).
The constraints it faces are:
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h     (4)
Z
h(s
t) = 0   if s
t˛N
h     (5)
We have written (3) as an equality on account of increasing preferences. If s
t is agent h’s
initial node h (so that s
t - 1 is not in N
h), the right side of (3b) does not have the middle term. (5)
requires that each agent holds the empty portfolio whenever it dies.8
The infimum in (4) is agent h’s borrowing limit at s
t, assumed to be nonnegative. When
infinitely lived agents exist, some borrowing limits are needed in order to rule out the Ponzi
scheme. While all kinds of borrowing limits are possible a priori, the “canonical” specification
given in (4), which is proposed by Santos and Woodford (1997), among others, seems the most
natural. In (4), {a(s
r)} is a state price process defined on N, whose existence is guaranteed by the
absence of finite-horizon arbitrage (Ross, 1976; Yu, 1998). The infimum is over all possible state
price processes on N. (4) implicitly assumes that the infinite sum therein converges. Given the
possibility of negative w
h + L
h terms, the sum may not always converge. When the sum does not
converge, one could modify (4) and replace  









. The borrowing limits in (4)
are the tightest that still allow all finite-horizon borrowing. They do not constrain finitely lived
agents at all.
Let H (s
t) be the collection of agents for whom s
t is a terminal node, and let H(s
t)/H (s
t) be
the collection of agents that are in H(s
t) but not in H (s
t). If H(s
t)/H(s
t) is empty at some s
t, then
by (5) all the agents alive at s
t will hold the empty portfolio after the trading at s
t, and there cannot
be an equilibrium unless all assets have zero supply at s
t. Even if there is an equilibrium, the
economy is in some sense discontinued at s
t. To avoid such strange scenarios, we assume that
H(s
t)/H(s
t) is non-empty at each s
t.







t)}. If they represent an Arrow-Radner
equilibrium, they must satisfy the following necessary conditions:
(i) For each s








t)} are optimal under (3)-(5),
(iii) For each s










t - 1)] =   ~ w (s








t) = 0 and Z3(s




t)} are technologically compatible.
We will not study the existence of the kind of equilibrium described above. The existence
of Arrow-Radner equilibrium in a basic finite-horizon setting is established by Radner (1972). For
a discussion of the existence issue in an infinite-horizon economy similar to ours, see Hernandez
and Santos (1996).
3. Results
This section presents our results. Let Z
h












t)} represent an initial equilibrium. Suppose the government
changes {Z3(s
t)} to { $ Z3(s
t)} through open market exchanges. By (2), the required total transfer














t - 1) - Z3(s
t - 1)] (8b)
Let { $ L
h(s
t),  $ Z
h
3 (s















t) =  $ Z3(s
t) (9)
The equivalence question is whether there exist { $ L
h(s
t),  $ Z
h
3 (s
t)} satisfying (9) and (8) and
some { $ Z
h
< > 3 (s
t)}, which may or may not be the same as {Z
h
< > 3 (s
t)}, such that {q(s







< > 3 (s
t),  $ Z
h
3 (s
t)} represent a new equilibrium. Without using a complete markets assumption, the
following theorem shows there indeed exists such a new equilibrium.10











t)} represent an initial equilibrium.
Then there exist { $ L
h(s
t),  $ Z
h
3 (s
t)} satisfying (9) and (8) such that {q(s











t)} represent a new equilibrium.
Proof: At each s
t, pick a change absorbing agent h(s
t)˛H(s
t)/H (s
t). Let  ~ H  be the set of
agents so picked. Note that an agent may be picked more than once (even an infinite number of
times), and so the same agent in  ~ H  can have more than one picking-node designated names.
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t) to















t ( ) (s
t+1) to










The transfer of each agent in  ~ H undergoes only the prescribed change, and the transfer of any
agent not in  ~ H does not change.
We change the bond holdings according to the following scheme. For each s
t, change
h(s




















t)’s bond holding at each s
t+1|s
t unchanged. The asset holding of each agent
in  ~ H  undergoes only the prescribed change, and the asset holding of any agent not in  ~ H  does not
change.
It is then obvious that the prescribed transfers and asset holdings satisfy (9) and (8), and
that the asset holdings clear the markets, are optimal for each hˇ ~ H  and imply the initial11
consumption for each h˛ ~ H. We now verify that the asset holdings are also optimal for each
h˛ ~ H . At any s
t and under any state price process {a(s










Multiplying (13) by  $ Z3(s
t) - Z3(s







t ( ) s s







 = - 
1
a s
t ( ) s s
t t + ￿
1|
a(s





t ( ) (s
t+1)] (14)
(14) implies that h(s
t)’s borrowing limit is not violated at s
t as a result of its transfer and asset
holding changes prescribed above. Also, by using (10) in (14), we get:
a(s





t ( ) (s
t)] + 
s s
t t + ￿
1|
a(s





t ( ) (s
t+1)] (15)
(15) implies that the future resource as viewed at any predecessor of s
t does not change, and so
h(s
t)’s borrowing limit is not violated at any predecessor of s
t. It is also easy to see that h(s
t) can
attain under the initial transfer any consumption that it can attain under the new transfer without
violating any borrowing limit. Therefore, the prescribed asset holdings are also optimal for each
h˛ ~ H  under the prescribed transfers. Q.E.D.
Since the agent picking is arbitrary, the same open market operations can usually be
canceled by many different transfer schemes. For a representative agent economy, the proposed
transfer scheme is the only one possible, and Theorem 1 becomes a generalized Ricardian
equivalence result: it implies that neither the level nor the composition of debt matters. An
implication of this observation is that the effects of a change in government finance are necessarily
based on the heterogeneity of agents.12
What  happens if one of the bonds is transactional money of either Sidrauski-Brock or
Clower-Lucas-Stokey variety? (Sidrauski, 1967; Brock, 1974; Clower, 1967; Lucas and Stokey,
1987.) It is clear from the proof that Theorem 1 will remain valid as long as the path of money
supply does not change; in the new equilibrium, the money holding of each agent stays
unchanged.
Agent h’s lifetime resource as valued by state price process {a(s
r)} is given by:
W
h(h, a) = 
1
a h ( ) s h






Recall that h is agent h’s unique initial node. By (15), the transfer changes prescribed in the proof
of Theorem 1 leave W
h(h, a) unchanged under any {a(s
r)} for any h˛ ~ H .
We have shown that some transfer scheme that leaves each agent’s lifetime resource
unchanged (under any {a(s
r)}) can cancel a change in government finance. The question now is if
and when any such transfer scheme can do it. An obvious condition needed for establishing an
“any transfer” result is that markets are complete; without this condition we have no reason to
believe that unchanging lifetime resource implies unchanging attainable consumption set.
To see that the complete markets condition is not enough, consider an open market
exchange that changes the asset supply but not total asset value at s
0 in an economy with two-date





0)], is absorbed entirely by
transfer changes for the agents born at s
1, and the transfer of any agent in H(s
0) does not change
either at s
0 or at any s
1|s
0. It is then clear that the asset demand by agents in H(s
0) does not
change, and so given the changed asset supply at s
0, markets usually cannot clear at s
0 at the initial
prices. On the other hand, it is possible for all the agents born on t = 1 or later to also have
unchanged lifetime resource; an example is a deterministic economy with two-date lives, with13
each agent born on t = 1 or later having an old age transfer change that cancels its youth transfer
change. Therefore, without further restriction, some transfer scheme that leaves each agent’s
lifetime resource unchanged cannot cancel the open market exchange.
The difficulty arises because agents in H(s
0) must hold the changed asset supply at s
0 in
any equilibrium, but they are not compensated for the return changes on the t = 1 nodes that the
supply change at s
0 causes. The remedy is then to introduce transfers that compensate the return
changes. When all the agents in H(s
0) have two-date lives, the compensating transfers have to be
made at the t = 1 nodes. In the more general case, some of the compensating transfers can be
made at the t > 1 nodes. The compensating transfers are needed not only for s
0, but also for every
other node. As the theorem below shows, given complete markets, these compensating transfers
and both sufficient and necessary for an “any transfer” result to obtain. When markets are
complete, we let {a(s
t)} be the unique state price process with a(s
0) = 1.







t)} represent the initial equilibrium. Suppose
markets are complete. Let { $ L
h(s
t)} be a set of transfers such that
s N





r h ˛ ￿ a(s
r)L
h(s
r)   for each h (17)
Then there exists { $ Z
h (s
t)} satisfying (9) and (8) such that {q(s




t),  $ Z
h (s
t)} represent
a new equilibrium if and only if
   R(s
t+1)[ $ Z(s
t) - Z(s
















r)]   for each s
t and each s
t+1|s
t   
(18)14
 By (18), the total transfer change from each s
t+1|s
t on for all the agents alive at s
t is equal
to the total return change at s
t+1. If all the agents in H(s
















(19) is a slightly more general form of Wallace (1981)’s second requirement for the new transfer
scheme.
Multiplying (18) by a(s
t+1), summing the result over s
t+1|s
t and using the basic state price




t)] = - 
1
a s
t ( ) h H s
t ˛￿
( ) s s r t
r t | , > ￿ a(s





Proof of Theorem 2: We first prove the sufficiency part. It is well-known that, with
complete markets, the set of attainable consumption for a finitely lived agent is determined
entirely by the lifetime resource. The same is true for an infinitely lived agent if borrowing limits
are given by (4), as our arguments below will verify. By (17), each agent has the same lifetime
resource and so can attain the initial consumption, which remains optimal. The question is
whether markets can clear. We will construct a complete set of market clearing asset holdings and
show that they imply the initial consumption for each agent and also satisfy all the borrowing
limits.
At each node s
t, pick a change absorbing agent h(s
t)˛ H(s
t)/H (s
t). An agent may be
picked more than once.
For each h˛H(s
0) other than h(s



















0)] = - 
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0), only (21a) is relevant. By (5a), any  $ Z
h (s
0) satisfying (21a) will leave h’s
consumption at s
0 unchanged. Because markets are complete, (17) implies that a  $ Z
h (s
0) satisfying
(21) can be found. The “correct” returns given by (21b) means  $ Z
h (s
0) can be the first component
of a trading plan that keeps agent h’s later consumption unchanged as well.
Let h(s
0)’s asset holding at s
0 be
$ ( ) Zh s
0
(s
0) =  $ Z(s
0) -
h H s h h s ˛ „ ￿














t). Summing (3a) over
all agents in H(s
















0-) +  $ L(s
0) (23b)
By (8a), (23) implies $ c(s
0) = c(s
0). Because consumption at s













Summing (21b) over all agents in H(s
0) except h(s
0) and subtracting the result from (18) as








h s ( )
0
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r |
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By (24),  $ ( ) Zh s
0
(s
0) can be the first component of a trading plan that keeps agent h(s
0)’s
consumption unchanged.
Suppose that, for some s
t - 1 and all its predecessors, each agent in H(s
t - 1)/H (s
t - 1) has
chosen asset holdings that imply the initial consumption at these nodes and also leave just enough
resource at s
t so that it can attain the initial consumption at s





t - 1) - Z
h(s
t - 1)] = - 
1
a s
t ( ) s s






We will show that there then exist a set of market clearing asset holdings at s
t that imply
the initial consumption at s
t for each agent in H(s
t) and also leave just enough resources at each
s
t+1|s
t so that each agent in H(s
t) can attain the initial consumption at s
t+1|s
t and all its successors.
Since we have found the  $ Z
h (s
0) satisfying (21b), which is (25) as applied to s
1|s
0, for each agent
in H(s
0) (including h(s
0)), by mathematical induction we will have constructed a complete set of
market clearing asset holdings that imply the initial consumption for each agent.
For each h˛H(s
t) other than h(s
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r)]   for each s
t+1|s
t (26b)
By (26) and (25), which is valid for agents born at s

















t)] = 0 (27)17
Therefore, with complete markets, such a  $ Z
h (s
t) can be found. By (26),  $ Z
h (s
t) implies the initial
consumption at s
t for h and also leaves just enough resource at each s
t+1|s
t so that h can attain the
initial consumption at s
t+1|s
t and all its successors.
Let h(s
t)’s asset holding at s
t be
$ ( ) Zh s
t
(s
t) =  $ Z(s
t) - 
h H s h h s
t t ˛ „ ￿




Summing (25) over all agents in H(s
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t) - L(s
t) (29)
Summing (26a) over all agents in H(s
t) other than h(s
t) and subtracting the result from (29), we
get:
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(30) and (3b) imply $






t). Summing (26b) over all agents in H(s
t) other than h(s
t)
and subtracting the result from (18) as it is applied to s
t+1|s
t, we get:
     R(s





















t ( ) (s
r)] for each s
t+1|s
t   
(31)18
(31) implies h(s
t) has just enough resource at each s
t+1|s
t to attain the initial consumption at s
t+1|s
t
and all its successors. This completes our construction of a complete set of market clearing asset
holdings that imply the initial consumption for each agent.
It is easy to see that the change of asset value by any h at any s
t is exactly matched by the
change of the future resource viewed at s
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which shows the change of h’s asset value at s
t is equal to the negative of the change of its future
transfers. Therefore, no borrowing limit for any h is violated at any s
t.
It is also easy to see that each agent can attain under the initial transfer any consumption it
can attain under the new transfer. This establishes the optimality of the new asset holdings and
concludes the proof of sufficiency.
The proof of sufficiency has made it clear that, faced with unchanged lifetime resource, a
necessary condition for agent h to attain the initial consumption, which remains optimal, is for
(26b) to be satisfied at each s
t˛N
h. The necessity of (18) follows from summing (26b) over
h˛H(s
t). Q.E.D.
The key condition of Theorem 2 is (18), which requires that the total return change at any
s
t+1|s
t be equal to the sum of resource change from s
t+1 on over agents alive at s
t. Put differently,
(18) requires that, for each s
t, agents alive at s
t are collectively compensated for next period’s
return change (in each state of nature) by transfer changes from the next period on. Note that (18)
is an aggregate condition; it does not require that an individual agent be compensated in a
particular way.19
(18) is closely related to the intergenerational links that normally underlie the validity of
the Ricardian equivalence. In Theorem 2, intergenerational links are not imposed, but the changes
in government finance are restricted to those that do not imply intergenerational transfers: at each
s
t, “generation” H(s
t) faces future transfer changes that exactly cancel future return changes. For
an economy consisting of infinitely lived “dynasties”, (18) is automatically satisfied. (To see this,
multiply (8b) as it is applied to some s
r by a(s
r) and sum the result from s
t+1 on.) Based on these
observations, Theorem 2 may also be regarded as a generalized Ricardian equivalence result.
What happens if one of the bonds is transactional money? First, note that redundancy of
money cannot be consistent with an equilibrium in which some agent is not satiated with
transactional service, because it implies that any agent can costlessly hold an arbitrarily large
quantity of money by simultaneously holding a bundle of other assets. If money is not a redundant
asset, keeping agent h’s future resource unchanged at each s
t˛N
h generally requires that agent h
changes its money holdings, and this calls for overall re-optimization by agent h, including
changes in consumption. We therefore cannot expect that there exists a new equilibrium with the
same consumption patterns and asset prices. Our conclusion, then, is that Theorem 2 is not valid
in the presence of transactional money.
4. Conclusion
Wallace (1981) regards his paper as “providing only a suggestion for a general Modigliani-
Miller theorem for open-market operations.” The present paper picks up on Wallace’s suggestion
and establishes two general equivalence theorems for government finance. The theorems are
applicable to the kind of open market exchanges found in Wallace (1981). They may also be
regarded as generalized Ricardian equivalence results.20
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